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Risk Assessment and Decision-Making for
Genetically Modified Foods
Aynsley Kellow*

Introduction
The recent experience in the United Kingdom with "Mad Cow
Disease" or Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) has engendered
a particular sensitivity among consumers regarding what they are
eating. BSE, thought to be caused by a protein molecule called a prion,
produced the devastating "new variant" Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease
1
(vCJD) in humans who consume nerve tissue.
BSE was shocking, not so much because of the scope of the problem
in humans since relatively few people have contracted vCJD, but
because of the horror of the disease. "Spontaneous" CJD was best
known previously among those treated with growth hormone extracted
from the pituitary glands of dead humans, or as "Kuru" in Papua, New
Guinea, where ritual cannibalism involved the consumption of human
brain tissue. The BSE experience has fueled concerns about foods which
have been produced using the new technology of genetic engineering.
But the way in which concerns have developed into policy responses has
been markedly different in Europe than in the U.S., where concerns
exist, but have not had a significant impact on policy development.
Why?
* Aynsley Kellow is Professor and Head of the School of Government at the University of
Tasmania, Australia. His degrees are as follows: B.A. (Hons) and Ph.D. (Otago). He is the
author of International Toxic Risk Management: Ideals, Interests and Implementation and coeditor of Globalisation and the Environment: Risk Assessment and the WTO. He has also
published articles in journals such as Natural Resources Journal, Policy Studies Journal,
Political Studies, Environmental Politics, Energy and Environment, and International
Political Science Review on aspects of public policy and environmental politics. Email:
akellow@utas.edu.au.
1 As John Adams has noted, however, the prion theory of causation is by no means
universally accepted. See John Adams, Cars, Cholera and Cows: Virtual Risk and the
Management of Uncertainty, 80 Science Progress 253 (1997). The theory that BSE causes
nvCJD is weakened by contrary facts, such as known cases of nvCJD among vegetarians.
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To answer that question, we must delve into the process of risk
assessment, whereby different political systems confronted with the
same scientific evidence can reach fundamentally different positions on
how to manage any particular risk. In doing so, we can also shed some
light on why, what the alarmists have labelled "Frankenstein food," has
evoked much more concern than the use of genetic engineering to
produce pharmaceuticals. In a wonderful irony, genetic engineering has,
for a decade, allowed the production of a growth hormone which has
avoided the risk of CJD without giving rise to any alarm.
Understanding risk assessment also allows U.S. to understand why this
is so, and points towards ways in which we should assess the risk of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
Concerns about beef in Europe are not new. Hormone-treated beef
has been in dispute between the EU (EU) and the U.S. since 1985,
when the then European Community imposed a regulation prohibiting
the sale or importation of beef raised with the assistance of artificial
hormones. At that time, problems had arisen in Italy among children
who consumed European beef which had been injected intramuscularly
with hormones, while the U.S. argued that their production methods
did not give rise to the same risks since they used hormone patches
behind the ear of cattle beasts. Since the ear was not consumed, there
was no chance that high concentrations of residues could find their way
2
into meat sold for consumption.
The more recent dispute has not involved artificial hormones at all,
but naturally-occurring bovine somatotrophin (BST) produced by
3
organisms which have been genetically modified (GM).
Recombinant BST (i.e., bacteria whose genetic material has been
modified so they will produce it) has been available for commercial use
in the U.S. since February 1994, but was not approved for use in the
EU, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, or Norway. The product is
2

See John H. Jackson, Dolphins and Hormones: GA TT and the Legal Environment for

International Trade After the Uruguay Round, 14 UALR L.J. 429, 435-36 (1992).
3
See Globalisation and the Environment: Risk Assessment and the WTO (David
Robertson & Aynsley J. Kellow eds., Edward Elgar 2001) (regarding the relationship between
trade rules, environment, and quarantine risk).
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produced using the identical BST synthesised by the cattle, and is thus
indistinguishable from naturally-grown beef - itself the result of
animal husbandry techniques and eons of selective breeding by humans
to improve productivity. So why the concern?
Part of the answer can be gauged from the way in which other EU
nations exploited Britain's BSE tragedy, in which about one million
cattle had to be slaughtered. 4 The tragedy was a bonanza for
continental beef producers, since it allowed bans on trade in British beef
within the European single market and restaurants were able to
advertise their steak as being non-British or "French Charolais." There is
almost always a silver lining for someone in any such dark cloud - but
more on that later.
Risk and Nature
how our food is grown and prepared.
about
Increasingly, we care
We no longer eat restaurant dishes with classic names like "Steak
Diane," but instead prefer dishes with names such as "rump of grass-fed
yearling Aberdeen Angus beef, pan-fried .... ." The sizzle has become at
least as important as the sausage, and part of the sizzle has to do with
our conceptions of nature, particularly with somewhat romantic notions
of purity or the absence of contamination. Organic is good, despite the
fact that organic chemistry has given the U.S. all those pesticides about
which we are so concerned.
"Chemical" is usually synonymous with synthetic chemical, and
these notions of purity extend to the bottled water we buy. It was
possible to buy bottled water from the Snowy Mountains in Australia
which was labelled organic - somewhat absurd when the whole point
of drinking bottled water is to be sure that it is absolutely free from
organic substances. Similarly, the label of water bottled at a spring in
Tasmania boasted that it was free of chemicals - right beside an
analysis of the calcium and other minerals it contained.
4
The economic cost to the U.K. has been over £3 billion (approximately $5.25 million in
U.S. dollars).
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And while we are told that we should be concerned about traces of
chemicals in the environment which can mimic hormones, we are
increasingly drinking soy milk. Soy milk contains sufficiently high
concentrations of phytoestrogens that are recommended as both a
natural alternative to hormone replacement therapy and as a means of
preventing prostate cancer.
Our perceptions of risks and benefits, as these examples show, are
almost inevitably affected by factors other than just the objective
science describing toxicity, carcinogenicity, and so on. Many of our
perceptions of risk are affected by questions such as: whether the risks
affect children or adults; whether the risks are accepted voluntarily or
imposed; whether processes are secret or open; whether the risks are
assessed by industry or by analysts seen as disinterested; whether they
involve the catastrophic death of large numbers of people or a
succession of isolated deaths; what kind of deaths occur; whether the
effects are immediate or delayed; and whether the risks are natural or
man-made. For example, travelling ten miles by bicycle in the U.S. and
living for fifty years within five miles of a nuclear reactor have both
been estimated to yield an increased probability of death of one in one
5
million, yet we respond to these risks quite differently.
One factor which affects our perceptions of risk associated with
chemicals, GMOs, and drugs is the fact that these products are
manufactured by large, faceless corporations, usually transnational
corporations, which are seen as being beyond the control of
governments. As anthropologist Mary Douglas has pointed out, many
of our fears about such risks reflect our sense of powerlessness in the
face of such corporate giants in an increasingly globalised world. 6 But
she also argues that risks are used to blame those already disliked.
5
See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk: Reflections on the Psychometric Paradigm, in
Social Theories of Risk 117 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Goldings eds., Praeger 1992);
Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conception Framework 8 Risk
Analysis 177 (1988); Joseph V. Rodricks, Calculated Risks: Understanding the Toxicity and
Human Health Risks of Chemicals in Our Environment (Cambridge U. Press 1992); see also
John Adams, Risk (UCL Press 1995) (an excellent introduction to the topic).
6
Mary Douglas, Risk & Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory 15 (Routledge 1992).
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This phenomenon is exacerbated by the fact that the regulation by
such hazardous substances poses problems which are tailor-made for
those who would wish to amplify the risks. All typically involve
intellectual property, and patent law provides for a period of monopoly
to recover development costs and profits, balancing the public good of
having lower prices which competition would bring against the public
good of encouraging research, and development by industry. But this
means that most of the research regarding the safety of such products is
conducted either by the corporations themselves, by contract scientists,
or research laboratories who must be contractually bound to honor
7
commercial confidentiality.
Regulators must use such science in making licensing decisions, but
it is easy to construct a somewhat paranoid discourse around both the
science and the scientists in such circumstances. Products found to
represent a low hazard can still be claimed to constitute an unacceptable
risk when most of the science can be dismissed as the biased product of
self-interested industry or of corrupted scientists who have undertaken
8
research consultancies.
Science can be wrong. Bias is a constant problem. But science has
developed means of minimizing such pitfalls. It can never eliminate
them completely, but the canons of the scientific method, if followed,
can improve the reliability of scientific knowledge. The courts in the
hyper-litigious U.S. have had to rule on what constitutes acceptable
scientific evidence in the face of a tendency for parties to hire their own
expert witnesses. The courts have, not surprisingly, decided that the
appropriate test was whether the information was generated by
following key elements of the scientific method, such as replicability of
results and publication after anonymous peer review. 9 Scientific
7
Patents for pharmaceuticals might offer no protection if a competitor could add to the
molecule an additional but meaningless chemical element or two which might simply be
removed in reaction with stomach juices, for example. For more information regarding this
matter, see Aynsley Kellow, International Toxic Risk Management: Ideals, Interests and
Implementation (Cambridge U. Press 1999) (a discussion of the importance of patents in
regulation of chemical and pharmaceutical risk).
See Sharon Beder, Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism (Scribe
8
1997) (an example of this genre).
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knowledge always contains some residual uncertainty, but we have
learned to place more faith in knowledge that emerges from such a
process than that which appears from research that has not followed
established scientific protocols.
While the source of funding might alert the U.S. to the direction in
which a piece of scientific research might be biased, the appropriate test
must be adherence to the scientific method. Against such science, we
are often asked to be alarmed about the implications of research which
has not yet been replicated and, in some cases, not yet published in
peer-reviewed journals. Regardless of its source - industry or an
environmental group - we should be extremely wary about acting
upon such "science."
This is so even for those interest groups which profess to have the
public good at heart. It has been suggested that there is a "danger
establishment," consisting of scientists (especially in grant-rich areas of
research), journalists, politicians, bureaucrats, and environmental and
other public interest groups which have an interest in exaggerating
dangers.IO Because many researchers and journalists often clamour to
build support or a readership, they tend to shout to be heard. We need
to be aware, in other words, that bias can enter our social risk
assessments from many directions. Recall examples such as the
McBride case in Australia, where research by the scientist who
discovered the teratogenic effects of thalidomide was found to have
been falsified to exaggerate the dangers of a drug to secure continued
funding for a research institute.
We should see Greenpeace - even if we share its goals - as not
just an environmental group, but also as a transnational private company
which licenses its trademark to thus-controlled foreign subsidiaries and
which has among its informal goals that of system maintenance. Like
any organization, it has salary and operating costs to cover, and it must
try to retain its annual revenue base of well over $150 million
9
See James T. Rosenbaum, Lessons From Litigation Over Silicone Breast Implants: A Call
For Activism by Scientists, 276 Science 1524-25 (1997).
10 See Thomas M. Dietz & Robert W. Rycroft, The Risk Professionals (Social Research
Perspectives, Occasional Reports on Current Topics, No. 14) (Russell Sage Foundation 1987).
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worldwide. It would be an exceptional organization which managed to
purge itself of the pursuit of system-maintenance. It can therefore be
expected to focus its effort in areas and ways which will heighten
concern and willingness to pay, especially since it rewards fund-raising
success internally with decision-making influence.
Greenpeace specializes in politicized science, often committing the
cardinal scientific sin of bringing the evidence to the theory, usually in
the form of dramatic visual footage supplied to the media from some
remote location. Perhaps because of the remoteness and perhaps
because of Greenpeace's perceived disinterestedness, news editors screen
such footage when they would not do the same for footage supplied by
more obviously interested sources.1 1 Footage of the retreating Bering
Glacier on the eve of a climate change conference provides powerful
support for action on climate change, but science is also interested in
why, for example, glaciers in New Zealand are advancing.
We can illustrate this with the problems generated by Greenpeace's
politicization of science associated with GMOs. In June of 1999, France
was leading the push within the EU to ban the importation of
genetically modified food. France is not regarded as an environmental
vanguard state in Europe, but it is one of the strongest supporters and
greatest beneficiaries of the Common Agricultural Policy. It was
supported in this push by Greenpeace, whose members dressed as
butterflies and carried a banner containing the slogan "Give butterflies a
chance" to the meeting of EU Environment Ministers in Luxembourg
on June 24, 1999. Citing a recent U.S. study which indicated that
pollen from genetically-engineered Bt-maize could kill the larvae of
Monarch butterflies, Greenpeace invoked the precautionary principle in
urging a ban. The EU froze the approval process.

11 At a political science conference in Christchurch, New Zealand in 1998, a TVNZ news
executive stated that his corporation never screened footage from sources outside the company
or established news services - except for Greenpeace!
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This piece of scientific knowledge, combined with the
precautionary principle, gave considerable power to the coalition of
Greenpeace and European agriculture, but it took what appears to have
been sound but limited science further than it should have and ignored
contextual factors completely in providing a convenient protectionist
cloak.
The Monarch butterfly research was published by John Losey at
Cornell University in a refereed letter to the journal Nature. 12 Losey
issued a careful press release, which was totally ignored by the media
and Greenpeace, stating that the research was conducted in the
laboratory and that it would therefore be inappropriate to draw any
conclusions about the risk to Monarch populations based solely on these
initial results. The reasons for this caution are obvious when the nature
of the experiment is considered. Hatchling Monarch larvae were given a
diet consisting solely of milkweed leaves (their exclusive diet) dusted
with corn pollen. 1 3 In the wild, larvae are known to avoid leaves with
pollen on them and move to a clean leaf. Further, milkweed is rarely
found in cornfields because farmers seek to control all weeds, but it is
commonly found in pastures and old fields. Maize pollen also does not
travel far - little can be found thirty feet from a cornfield and it is
practically non-existent at 100 feet. Finally, the period when maize
pollinates and monarch larvae feed are both very short and might not
even overlap in some seasons.
The toxin produced by the GM maize in this experiment was Bt
toxin, so named because it is found in a common soil bacterium,
Bacillus thuringiensis. Bt toxin is used by organic farmers as essentially
their only pesticide, and they fear that its use in GM crops might cause
the insects it protects against to develop immunity. This, rather than
concerns over Bt toxicity, lies at the heart of opposition from organic
farmers. 14
Reductionist risk assessment - attempting to regulate solely on the
basis of toxicity - ignores these crucial exposure factors and relies
12

John E. Losey et al., Transgenic Pollen Harms Monarch Butterfly, 399 Nature 214

(1999).
13 Older larvae might be less susceptible.
14

See

VitalSource,

GM:

What

is

Known

and/or

<http://vitalsource.org/gm/science.html> (accessed July 14, 1999).

in

Dispute?

at
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solely upon the science of toxicity, which can be persuasive, especially to
those who wish to invoke the risk-averse precautionary principle. It not
only advantages economic interests threatened by the advantages of Btmaize. It also carries an environmental opportunity cost, since nonmodified maize is sprayed for insect pests eight to ten times, a practice
which is likely to cause substantially more harm to Monarch butterflies
and other insects.
Social risk assessment requires a careful analysis of the best available
science, an understanding of the social and psychological factors which
15
will inevitably intrude into the process, and careful policy analysis.
Such policy analysis requires prioritization of candidates for risk
management, a task made more difficult because of the shouting of the
"danger establishment," and the need to carefully weigh the costs and
benefits involved. No activity can ever be risk-free. There is always a
need to consider the costs of risk management including
opportunity costs - and to be careful of the social context within
which the decision is made. A cholera epidemic in Peru once killed
3,000 people because of a decision to follow a U.S. Environmental
16
Protection Agency risk assessment and not chlorinate water supplies.
Chlorinated water carries an elevated risk of bladder cancer of 0.8 per
100,000,17 but we need to remember that the costs of avoiding this
risk can be much higher.
Risk and Precaution

The cholera example is particularly apt because the actions of a
physician amid the squalor of the industrial revolution are often taken
as reinforcement of the need to apply the "precautionary principle" in
cases of environmental or health risk. In 1849, before the discovery of
the cause of cholera, a London doctor, Dr. John Snow, suspected that
the source of one outbreak might be the water from a particular well
and removed the pump handle.
15 See John D. Graham & Jennifer Kassalow Hartwell, The Risk Management Approach, in
The Greening of Industry: A Risk ManagementApproach (Harv. U. Press 1997).
16 Christopher Anderson, Cholera Epidemic Traced to Risk Miscalculation, 354 Nature 255
(1991) (many thousands more died after the publication date of this item).
17 Rodricks, supra n. 5, at 218.
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Precaution is, of course, much better than cure, but such an
anecdotal understanding of history glorifies post hoc those who
happened to be right and ignores the multitude of cases where doctors
acting on similar imperfect knowledge were sadly wrong. How we
should exercize precaution is by no means self-evident, and the
reasonable-sounding, commonsense precautionary principle is
frequently misquoted and distorted to the point of nonsense.
The accepted version of the precautionary principle (in the Rio
Declaration in 1992) reads: "Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation."' 18 This is commonsense, but alone it cannot be
operationalized. We need to add meanings to the terms, serious,
irreversible, damage, and cost-effective, and decide what level of
uncertainty we are prepared to accept as the basis for action.
Advocates of this view often use the example of cigarette smoking.
It involves both business interests and uncertainty, and they like to
point to the exploitation of that uncertainty by industry to forestall
regulatory action. We now know the precise mechanisms by which
substances initiate cancer and attempt to aid progression by damaging
particular genes, but in fact we commenced regulatory action against
tobacco long before we had identified precise mechanisms of causation.
We did so on the basis of good peer-reviewed science which indicated a
problem over thirty years ago. While the tobacco lobby has been
particularly active and we have not banned tobacco, that reflects a
number of factors, including the loss of regulatory control prohibition
and taxation revenue to pay the costs of damage, which regimes carry
with them (witness heroin).
But it is not prudent to take regulatory action on the basis of no
evidence, or non-peer-reviewed science, or even a handful of scientific
papers. Sometimes we choose to accept risks; a risk assessment of quartz
might have resulted in a ban on children's sandpits in Sweden until
reality prevailed. 19 Motor vehicles kill thousands, directly or
18

See Lawrence E. Susskind, Global Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective

Global

Agreements 79 (Oxford U. Press 1994).
19

See Robert Nillson, Integrating Sweden into the European Union, in The Politics of
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indirectly, but we accept that their benefits outweigh these risks
(although there are strong lobbies which contest the existing risk-benefit
trade-off and seek more regulation). But some seek to invoke the
precautionary principle as a justification for not just reversing the
burden of proof, but to demand a logically-impossible proof of safety,
or the absence of harm. Demanding that a negative be proved is the
logical equivalent of asking people to prove that they are not witches.
In addition, however, environment groups and official documents
have stretched the meaning of the precautionary principle to the point
where it legitimizes the risk management strategy of Chicken Little and
has even found its way into international policies. For example,
Recommendation 89/1 of June 22, 1989 of the Paris Convention for
the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources stretched
it to include action "even where there is no scientific evidence to prove
a causal link between emissions and effects." 20 If this is accepted, all
one needs is some indication of serious and irreversible effects, and one
can demand logically-impossible proof of an absence of harm or else
regulatory action will be taken.
Everything is capable of causing harm under some circumstances; as
Paracelsus put it 500 years ago, everything is poisonous - the dose
makes the poison. So we must insist that the precautionary principle is
not misused and that risk assessment considers factors such as doses,
exposure pathways, individual and species susceptibilities, costs and
benefits, and the consequences of regulatory actions. Unless we do, we
are to forgo the benefits that a product might bring, and produce either
policy paralysis (as regulators freeze like rabbits in the glare of a
multitude of precautionary spotlights), or a wasteful misplaced set of
priorities (causing regulators to chase any number of hares which have
been released).

Chemical Risk: Scenariosfor a Regulatory Future 159, 167 (Roland Bal & Willem Halffman
eds., Kluwer 1998).
20 Nigel Haig, The Introduction of the PrecautionaryPrinciple into the UK, in Interpreting
the PrecautionaryPrinciple 243-46 (Timothy O'Riordan & James Cameron eds., Earthscan
1994) (emphasis added).
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Risk and GMOs
How does this apply to GMOs? In order to answer that question, it
is necessary first to state that the discussion which follows does not seek
to make a risk assessment of GMOs, nor engage in a detailed discussion
of the science of genetic modification and the hazards it might pose.
The analysis accepts that genetic engineering is a hazardous activity
which has been subjected to regulatory scrutiny from basic research
through to its applications since its inception in 1970. It accepts also
that the products of this technology provide benefits. It accepts that the
risk management process will be difficult and complex, but unless it is
performed, we run the risk of either forgoing benefits or experiencing
hazards.
But it also holds that risk assessment must be sensitive to particular
products and practices and specific exposures. A bacterium modified to
produce BST poses different risks than genetically modified cotton,
and cottonseed oil so produced poses different risks from the
consumption of a GM tomato where live DNA might be ingested. The
dangers posed by the possible escape of genes to wild species depend
crucially upon the GM species and the environment into which it might
be placed. For example, for the U.K., there are no compatible wild
relatives for maize or potatoes, so no gene transfer can occur. Rice and
soya are inbreeding species, so transfer is possible, but unlikely. With oil
rapeseed, on the other hand, this is an outbreeding species with many
wild relatives, so greater caution is necessary. The same holds for the
danger of consumption. Sugar from GM sugar beet contains no genetic
material whatsoever. Flour from GM soya may contain the new gene or
its product, but many of the purification processes used in food
21
production will destroy any DNA present in the raw material.
It is entirely possible that we might, as a society, decide that the
risks of one GM product are worthwhile while rejecting others. We
might reject a GM blue rose as being a trivial use of the technology
which poses an unacceptable risk, while accepting the gains of GM
21

See The Royal Society, Genetically Modified Plants for Food Use (The Royal Society

1998) (discussion of these issues).
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foods which taste better, keep better, and thus result in less wastage.
Lumping all genetic engineering together, and certainly condemning all
GM foods as Frankenstein food, is neither accurate nor helpful.
Making such decisions requires the participation of a wide range of
people other than just the relevant scientists, industry, and
environmental groups. Risk management is a process which requires the
application of relevant science, as well as statistics, ethics, economics,
sociology, and even political science, and certainly must have regard to
the views of the public. Attempts by scientists to prevent what they
might see as the intrusion of non-experts into the process are not only
unhelpful, but are likely to heighten public suspicion and apprehension.
Transparency and trust are vital.
There is a legitimate role for both industry and environmental
groups in this process, but neither should be allowed to dominate the
process. Unfortunately, the alarms seem to have run ahead of a
reasoned consideration of the issues. Despite the fact that there are few
GM plants yet licensed for use, we have considerable apprehension as
the result of tabloid reporting of the perils of Frankenstein food, with
local government authorities even banning GM food in kindergartens
and day-care centers.
The fear of Frankenstein food has been markedly more in evidence
in Europe than in the U.S., and it has had more impact on government
policies and on the policies of corporations. Some supermarkets have
refused to stock GM foods as the result of the effectiveness of boycotts
by Greenpeace's "Genetic Hazard Patrols." The responses of European
governments have varied. The U.K., France, and Spain appeared
initially to be more permissive than the northern European nations
where support for Greenpeace and green political parties is strongest,
but the question arises as to why the alarms have had greater impact in
the EU than in the U.S.
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A similar question arises as to why concern has been almost nonexistent over the use of genetic engineering to produce pharmaceuticals.
The answer to the first question lies partly in the accepted fact that
cultural dispositions to risk vary, 2 2 even within Europe, with much
stronger support for such causes evident in Northern Europe than in
Southern Europe. But consumers in the U.S., especially in the western
states, are well known for their propensity to be concerned about such
risks. The best explanations for these regional differences lie in a happy
coincidence between such values and economic interests which has led
to the institutional innovations that privilege risk-averse responses.
The precautionary principle had its origins in Germany as the
vorsorge prinzip (roughly "preventative action principle") and was used
to justify the "Green Keynesianism" developed by Helmut Kohl, also
known as "ecological modernization." 2 3 The export of the
precautionary principle has not only bolstered the approach
domestically, but has helped create markets for the export of
technology and services developed domestically. This is known as a
"first mover" strategy and runs counter to the widespread belief that
environmental regulation hinders the competitiveness of nations though it does depend on the successful export of policies and
standards which will create a market for the technologies and services in
24
which the nation has a new-found advantage.
As we saw previously, when misapplied, the precautionary principle
has considerable potential to undermine the risk management process
from the outset by giving credence to poor science. This has happened
with GM food. In a notable case, research on rats at the Rowett
Research Institute in Aberdeen, Scotland, was reported on television in
1998 to suggest that potatoes modified by the addition of a snowdrop
gene to produce a natural insecticidal chemical (i.e., lectin) interfered
22

Aaron Wildavsky & Mary Douglas, Risk and Culture (U. Cal. Press 1981).

23

Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, The Precautionary Principle in Germany -

Enabling

Government, in Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Timothy O'Riordan & James
Cameron eds., Earthscan 1994).
24 David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global
Economy (Harv. U. Press 1995).
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with the development of both the rats' internal organs and their
immune systems. The research was not on transgenic potatoes about to
be marketed, but an early part of research aimed at finding whether a
form of lectin which was (on the basis of previous testing) likely to be
least toxic to humans could protect potatoes from nematodes.
The researcher, Dr. Arpad Pusztai, has since been dismissed from
his job for a serious breach of scientific protocol - going public with
his claims before his research had been peer-reviewed and published in a
recognised scientific journal. 25 No paper had then been submitted for
publication, and a panel of six toxicologists appointed by the Royal
Society dismissed the research as being irrelevant, inconclusive, and
26
flawed in many aspects of design, execution, and analysis.
By the time this rebuttal appeared, the claims had already been a
key catalyst in the GMO debate in Britain, and a group of twenty
scientists had held a press conference to declare their support for Dr.
Pusztai. Despite the conclusion by the Royal Society panel that any
observed differences between GM-fed rats were uninterpretable because
of the technical limitations of the experiment and the incorrect use of
statistical tests, Friends of the Earth (FOE) was unswerving in its views
of the dangers of GM foods. FOE spokesman Tony Juniper resorted to
the "witchcraft" position: "There's no concrete proof that they are
27
safe."
According to Debora MacKenzie in the New Scientist, the technical
limitations of the experiment included the fact that Pusztai could not
make the rats eat enough potato. 2 8 Another limitation was the
presence of known toxins in potatoes. The only obvious conclusion
supported by his research, Mackenzie stated, was that rats hate
25 Technically, Dr. Pusztai's contract expired and he was not reappointed.
26 See BBC News, GM Food Study was Flawed <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hilenglish/
special~report/199902Ifood-underthemicroscopelnewsid_289000/289002.htm> (May 18,
1999). Pusztai's research was later published in The Lancet, under highly controversial
circumstances since rejection was recommended by several reviewers and the editor was
criticized for relaxing standards of peer-review to publish research of public interest.
27 Id.
28 The rats were malnourished no matter what kind they were eating and had to be given
protein supplements to meet Home Office guidelines for animal experiments.
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potatoes. 2 9 In fact, it was worse than that, as the methodology did not
involve blind testing under which researchers are unaware of which rats
were in the control group and which were being fed GM potato. This
created the possibility for the introduction of researcher bias, something
of concern when Dr. Pusztai was prepared to go public before
publication.
There are a number of technical issues which make the testing of
GM foods difficult, but as the reference to toxins in potatoes suggests,
this holds for unmodified food also, since people die each year from
the cyanide in peach seeds and undercooked kidney beans, which are
poisonous (they contain the very lectins involved in Pusztai's research).
Many foods also naturally contain chemicals which have exhibited
carcinogenic properties in laboratory tests, 30 but in such small amounts
that test procedures are likely to require such large quantities to be fed
to rats that the acute toxicity of other substances is likely to kill them
first.
An attempt to test GM tomatoes in the Netherlands involved
feeding rats the freeze-dried equivalent of thirteen tomatoes a day each.
This dose was still not enough. Monsanto's GM maize does not contain
enough of the Bt toxin produced by the novel gene for it to be isolated
for testing. They have to produce it from bacteria and then test it, but
this raises questions about whether the two toxins are identical. Some
transgenic foodstuffs (e.g., Flavr Savr tomatoes, Round-up Ready
soybeans, and virus-resistant squash) have undergone extensive testing
without any suggestion of serious health effects, 3 1 which should have
urged caution about the potato research.

29

Debora MacKenzie,

Unpalatable Truths, New Scientist

at

<http://gmworld.

newscientist.com/> (June i0, 1999).
30 See Bruce N. Ames et al., Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 Science 271
(1987).
31 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Food Safety
Evalation (OECD 1996).
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This suggests there is a need for caution as to how we evaluate the
hazards of GMOs, but it also stresses the need for the best possible
science underpinning our risk assessment processes. Much of the
difference between the approaches of the EU and the U.S. reflects the
different philosophies of risk which operate in each jurisdiction. The
institutionalization of the precautionary principle in Europe encourages
calls for action and government action itself on the basis of such
cscientific" evidence as the potato research of Dr. Pusztai, while the
U.S. approach to risk has been to examine the economic costs and
benefits of any risk management action.
Ironically, the lack of consideration of economic factors with the
EU approach facilitates the use of fears of GMOs by economic
interests. The fight against U.S. beef produced using recombinant BST
has been led by British beef producers, themselves harmed by BSE, and
the whole issue has allowed Europe to revisit the 1985 issues. The U.S.
has advantages in the use of biotechnology, and its economic efficiency
poses a considerable threat to the enormously costly and inefficient
Common Agricultural Policy, already under pressure after the Uruguay
Round liberalisations in agricultural trade. The GMO debate has
provided less efficient European producers of beef, soybeans, and so on,
with an opportunity to try to hobble their more efficient U.S.
competitors.
This partly explains why there has not been a similar outcry over
genetic engineering in the pharmaceuticals sector. Europe has an
efficient, competitive pharmaceuticals sector which would oppose and
contest campaigns on the issues, rather than support them (as with
agriculture). But even though the consumption-related risks from
pharmaceuticals - often directly injected into the body or packaged in
such a way as to facilitate absorption even after attack by digestive
juices - would appear to be equivalent to those associated with foods,
there has not really been a campaign mounted against them. There are
at least two other factors at work here: one relating to pharmaceuticals
and the other to agriculture.
The first is that the benefits side of the equation is much clearer
with pharmaceuticals and would be much more difficult to counteract.
A soybean which can be produced more cheaply does not quite offer
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the same kind or size of benefits as a drug produced by a GM
bacterium. Focusing political campaigns on food promises better
political returns than attacking possible cancer cures, especially when it
coincides with agricultural interests in Europe.
The second is that the anti-GM food campaign resonates strongly
with a campaign in the early 1980s over the introduction of Plant
Variety Rights (intellectual property rights for plants). Many concerns
then, such as the fear that agricultural genetic material being controlled
by large transnational corporations, not only have been repeated with
the GMO campaign, but the same fear of transnational dominance is a
key factor in amplifying risk perceptions of GMOs.
These fears were heightened by plans for the insertion of so-called
terminator genes into seeds, which would render the seeds of transgenic
crops infertile requiring growers to buy again from the multinationals
rather than engaging in the traditional practice of saving seed for next
year's crop. While this technology was owned by Delta and Pine Land
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Monsanto planned a takeover
of Delta and Pine Land, and it was attacked by activists over
terminator technology subsequently renouncing any future use of it.
Regardless, this would appear to have been something of a nonproblem. Third World farmers would be perfectly able to continue
traditional farming practices with traditional seed; transgenic crops will
only be grown where the benefits outweigh the costs of doing so. The
terminator situation was no different from that obtained with the seeds
of infertile hybrids, except that terminator genes could be seen to serve
a useful risk management function by preventing the escape of GM
stock into the wild. The feature was thus used to amplify risk
perception, while actually increasing the risks of GM technology.
Conclusion
The assessment of the risks of GMOs reflect numerous social and
institutional factors, and these help explain the differences between the
approaches in the U.S. and the EU, and between transgenic food and
transgenic medicine. These factors give rise to particular problems for
the trade regime as they offer plenty of scope for non-tariff barriers to
be erected in the name of the protection of health and the environment.
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They also throw some light on the elements we need to bring together
in order to properly assess the risks associated with GMOs.
First, there is a fundamental need for good science, and insistence
on sound, peer-reviewed science, and rejection of evidence gathered to
support theoretical predispositions - either that GMOs are dangerous
or that they are harmless. Second, there is a need to consider the
benefits, the dangers, and the costs, including opportunity costs, of any
decision we make. We should expect that any GMO might not be all
that the owners of the technology might make it out to be, but neither
is it without the promise of considerable benefits. Therefore, it cannot
be rejected lightly. There is also a need to undertake specific risk
assessments for different kinds of GMOs, taking care to distinguish
production-related risks (e.g., GM canola cross-pollinating or outbreeding with other species) from consumption-related risks (e.g., if
Dr. Pusztai turned to be right, GM potatoes affecting our immune
systems).
In addition, there is a need to accept that the social evaluation of
risks is likely to be more accepting of GMOs in medicine than in
health, and that such evaluations must be a central part of any risk
management process. There are identifiable reasons why, what society
will accept in saving lives, society might not tolerate in producing food.
That intolerance might hinder the adoption of GM technology in
agriculture, but attempting to impose outcomes on a reluctant public is
likely only to heighten fears. Openness and transparency - together
with good science and a consideration of costs - are the keys, but this
does not mean that the proponents of GM technology should abandon
the field to their critics. Society requires a full and open debate which
will expose the exaggerated claims which might come from any side
and allow it to make better decisions about which risks to accept and
which to reject.
Issues, such as genetic engineering, are tailor-made for the
32
development of what Frank Furedi has called a "culture of fear."
Such a culture thrives on secrecy and attempts to manipulate public
opinion to secure consent, which inevitably arouses suspicion and
32 Frank Furedi, Culture of Fear: Risk-taking and the Morality of Low Expectation (Cassell
1997).
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hostility. If genetic engineering is to be regarded as involving sociallyacceptable risks, the process by which the risks are assessed and
managed will have to be one the public trusts.
Our risk assessment of GM foods must therefore be careful to take
many factors into account. Genes (i.e., DNA) are a normal constituent
of our diet. It has been 200 years since the first report of hybrid cereals
were made, and we have been consuming the fruits of the deliberate
human transfer of genetic material between species since 1876 (Triticale
wheat x Rye cross). GM techniques expand these possibilities
enormously and rightly should be subjected to careful regulation. But
we would be wrong in supposing that all the risks we face are caused by
human agency, or that we are completely incapable of regulating them.
Ironically, both these lessons can be drawn from the mad cow
disease experience. The former is suggested by the fact that the best
hypothesis about the origins of BSE and vCJD seems to be a chance
occurrence of a rare spongiform encephaly, probably from scrapie in
sheep, which found its way into cattle food and then into the human
diet.3 3 The route might just have readily gone straight from sheep to
humans, but for a roll of the genetic dice. The outbreak might have
resulted from feeding rendered sheep carcasses to cattle, but the genetic
chance occurrence appears to have been a completely natural
occurrence.
The BSE/vCJD outbreak, despite the alarms, also demonstrates
that we are capable of regulating risks. BSE in cattle was first positively
diagnosed in cattle in 1986, and regulatory action was taken in 1988
and 1989 to remove infectious material from the animal and human
food chains. The risks of human exposure were highest at this time,
when public concern was almost non-existent, and with a possible tenyear incubation period. By 1997 there were only nineteen established
cases of vCJD in Britain and one in France, while there were over 80 by
2001. The horrific manner of death, rather than the frequency, has
heightened public concern. About one million cattle were slaughtered
and Britain's beef trade was harmed, but despite the high economic
stakes, scientists and regulators minimized the impact of the tragedy. It
is most certainly a tragedy, but it has not quite been an apocalypse. The
33

The Royal Society, Second Update on BSE (July 21, 1997).
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role of good science and risk management in limiting the scope of the
tragedy has been submerged in a climate of dread, and the risk
management success overlooked.
The BSE/vCJD tragedy had nothing to do with the GMO debate,
except its impact on public perceptions. Indeed, GM growth hormones
have removed the major source of risk of transmission of spontaneous
CJD barring outbreaks of ritual cannibalism. But the suspected origins
of the BSE outbreak also contain an important lesson about how we
should evaluate the risks of GMOs.
Until the early 1980s, the process by which carcasses were rendered
for stock food destroyed the infectious prion from the scrapie as they
were subjected to high temperatures and organic solvents to remove the
tallow. The price of energy rose, the price of tallow fell, and concerns
emerged over the exposure of workers to organic solvents leading to the
adoption of a new process created to avoid solvents and high
temperatures. The scrapie prion survived the new process and
34
subsequently it is believed to have infected cattle.
This serves to remind us that our actions have consequences that are
difficult to imagine. This holds not just for the introduction of new
technologies, but also for changes to old ones. GMOs present risks, but
they also present considerable opportunities. The challenge is to manage
the risks in order to maximize the benefits. How we do this requires the
best possible science, the right amount of precaution, and open and
democratic processes, an admixture which will be difficult but not
impossible to achieve.
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